University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Faculty Law Review Articles

Alexander Blewett III School of Law

2020

Beyond the Belloni Decision: Sohappy v.Smith and the Modern Era
of Tribal Treaty Rights
Monte Mills
Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, mtmills@uw.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/faculty_lawreviews
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mills, Monte, "Beyond the Belloni Decision: Sohappy v.Smith and the Modern Era of Tribal Treaty Rights"
(2020). Faculty Law Review Articles. 193.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/faculty_lawreviews/193

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Alexander Blewett III School of Law at ScholarWorks
at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Law Review Articles by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

BEYOND THE BELLONI DECISION: SOHAPPY V.
SMITH AND THE MODERN ERA OF TRIBAL TREATY
RIGHTS
BY
MONTE MILLS*
Indian tribes and their members are leading a revived political,
legal, and social movement to protect the nation’s natural resources.
In doing so, tribes and their allies employ many effective strategies
but core to the movement are the historic promises made to tribes by
the United States through treaties. Tribes are asserting treatyprotected rights, which the United States Constitution upholds as
the supreme law of the land, to defend the resources on which they
and their ancestors have relied for generations. Those claims have
resulted in significant legal victories, igniting a broader movement
in favor of tribal sovereignty and securing a prominent and
perpetual tribal presence in the movement and on the ground.
Given the strength of this modern movement and the centrality
of treaty rights to its success, it is hard to believe that, just two
generations ago, those rights faced seemingly existential threats.
Notwithstanding bedrock Supreme Court precedent from the first
half of the 1900s recognizing the supremacy of Indian treaties, tribal
members exercising the rights those treaties guaranteed were under
attack in the Pacific Northwest and the Great Lakes, with armies of
state wildlife rangers and law enforcement arresting tribal members
for not following state laws and regulations. Then, in 1968, the
Supreme Court cut against its earlier solicitude for tribal treaty
rights by opening the door for broad state power to establish laws,
rules, and regulations that could govern tribal members engaged in
treaty-reserved activities. Facing escalating harassment from state
authorities, the Court’s endorsement of state priorities seemed to
leave little room for the meaningful exercise of treaty rights as the
tribes and tribal members themselves saw fit.
*
Associate Professor, Director of the Margery Hunter Brown Indian Law Clinic, and Interim Co-Director of the Clinical Program, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana. Thanks to the faculty, staff, and students of Lewis & Clark Law
School for the invitation to an outstanding symposium celebrating the 50th anniversary of
the Belloni decision, which took place on October 18th, 2019, and at which this paper was
presented. Special thanks to Professor Michael C. Blumm for his help with this draft and
additional appreciation to Hallee Kansman for her research assistance.
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But, with his 1969 decision in Sohappy v. Smith, Judge Robert
Belloni began to reverse the course of that time and, in doing so,
opened the modern era of tribal sovereignty over natural resources.
Judge Belloni’s approach to reaching that momentous decision
recognized the permanence and supremacy of tribal treaties while
also accounting for the ongoing exercise of state sovereignty. Rather
than approach the balance of those two interests as a zero-sum
proposition, however, Judge Belloni sought and provided practical
guidance pursuant to which states and tribes could work together to
ensure their continued coexistence. While that coexistence would
demand higher burdens and more limitations on the state’s exercise
of authority, Judge Belloni also had the foresight to provide a
judicial forum for resolving conflicts over those burdens and
limitations and urged the parties to reach cooperative agreements
beyond the courtroom doors. Judge Belloni’s approach and the
Sohappy decision laid the foundation for state and federal courts
struggling to balance state authority and tribal treaty rights. This
Article traces the legacy of the Sohappy decision across litigation in
the Great Lakes region, where members of the Chippewa Tribes
fought to continue their time-honored and treaty-reserved practices,
various states sought to regulate those activities, and judges relied
on Judge Belloni’s wisdom and insight to reach sustainable
solutions.
I.
II.
III.

IV.
V.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Entering the second millennium’s third decade, American Indian
tribes and their members continue the lifeways, cultures, and traditions
that they and their ancestors have practiced since time immemorial.1
1 This Article uses the general descriptor “Indian” as the legal term of art widely incorporated into federal law, see for example Title 25 of the United States Code, entitled
“Indians,” but the author recognizes that other descriptors, such as Native American or
Indigenous, are far more accurate and appropriate. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1–4301 (2012). For a rich
discussion of the interwoven nature of the activities carried out by tribal members and
spirituality, see David Treuer: Language Carries More Than Words, ON BEING WITH
KRISTA TIPPET (June 19, 2008), https://perma.cc/3BG9-UZUL.
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These practices, including activities like hunting, fishing, and gathering,
are interwoven with the cultures, ceremonies, and spirituality of many
tribal societies, making their ongoing practice an essential aspect of
protecting and enhancing tribal existence.2 Unlike prior decades,
however, tribes and their expanding exercise of sovereignty, are now
two generations into a meteoric rise from the depths of the termination
era of the mid-Twentieth Century3 and leading the way to represent
those values and ensure their survival.4 In doing so, tribes, their allies,
and their members build upon the legal standing of treaties their
ancestors made with the United States and the protection those treaties
offer for the continued exercise of rights reserved therein.5 A recent
string of important victories demonstrate the permanence and power of
these arguments, as tribes push the boundaries of historic treaty
agreements to better serve their modern needs.6
While those victories have immediate impact,7 the future potential
of the current moment is even more striking, particularly in light of the
seemingly dim future that treaty-reserved rights faced just fifty years
ago. While the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized and upheld the
supremacy of treaties,8 and even insulated tribal members from some
state efforts to interfere with their exercise of treaty-reserved rights,9
those legal victories provided little actual protection for tribal members
seeking to fish or hunt in exercise of treaty-reserved rights until the late
1960s and early 1970s. In the Pacific Northwest, for example, the state
of Washington essentially waged war upon tribal fishermen, enacting
regulations to prohibit them from fishing, arresting them for violating
those regulations, and confiscating their boats and fishing gear.10 The
2 See, e.g., Native American Spirituality, INDIANS.ORG, https://perma.cc/M53E-548N
(last visited Apr. 18, 2020).
3 See generally CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN
NATIONS 57–86 (2005).
4 See, e.g., Anna Brady, Through Bears Ears, Tribes Lead the Way for True Collaboration over Utah’s Public Lands, UNIV. OF UTAH S.J. QUINNEY COLL. OF LAW ENVTL. DISPUTE
RESOL. BLOG (Nov. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/TH82-HHPK; see Anna V. Smith, The Klamath River Now Has the Legal Rights of a Person, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Sept. 24, 2019)
https://perma.cc/9BES-NK3U.
5 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 865 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming a
federal court injunction requiring the state to replace culverts that blocked or impeded
salmon migration and thereby interfered with the treaty reserved right of tribes to take
fish).
6 See, e.g., Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1691–92 (2019) (upholding treaty
rights of the Crow Tribe to hunt in Wyoming’s Bighorn National Forest).
7 Within months of the Herrera decision and its repudiation of Ward v. Race Horse,
163 U.S. 504 (1896), in which the Supreme Court invalidated the off-reservation treaty
rights of the Eastern Shoshone and Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, those Tribes began considering how best to resume the exercise of those rights. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1697; Savannah Maher, E. Shoshone and Shoshone-Bannock Tribes Meet to Discuss Off-Reservation
Hunting, WYO. PUB. RADIO (July 31, 2019), https://perma.cc/4D6S-BBZC.
8 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 382–84 (1905).
10 See, e.g., CHARLES WILKINSON, MESSAGES FROM FRANK’S LANDING: A STORY OF
SALMON, TREATIES, AND THE INDIAN WAY 33, 34, 38–40 (2000); United States v. State of
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situation in the Great Lakes region was similar.11 Those state-supported
assaults mixed with the economic interests and racism of non-Indian
communities created dangerous conditions for tribal members and their
traditional practices.12
Even the United States Supreme Court seemed to change course
from its earlier reverence for treaties, rendering a milquetoast 1968
decision in Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game13 (Puyallup I),
broadly endorsing Washington’s ability to regulate tribal fishermen.
Although treaties remained the supreme law of the land,14 Puyallup I
treated their constitutional status only abstractly and the Court
appeared uninterested in protecting actual, non-theoretical exercise of
the rights reserved in those agreements.15 Instead, the first Puyallup
decision suggested that the nation’s highest Court would blithely defer
to state interests.16 When matched with the ferocity of state and local
opposition to the exercise of treaty rights on the ground, the Court’s
recognition of a legal basis from which state governments could act
marked a potentially existential threat: if the practice of treatyprotected activities would be subject to state power—even if only in the
name of conservation—with few clear limits, the permanence of those
practices and the tribal role in protecting them would be seriously
jeopardized.17
But, despite the setback of Puyallup I and the dangers from state
police and local non-Indians, tribes and tribal members across the
country refused to accept the possibility that their time-honored rights
might be diminished.18 Tribal hunters, fishers, and gatherers continued
to exercise their rights, and tribes, along with the United States as
trustee on their behalf, began to consider new legal avenues for
defending those rights. Richard Sohappy and thirteen of his fellow
members of the Yakama Nation, insisted on a different future for tribes

Wash., 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that the State of Washington’s efforts
to avoid federal court orders requiring management of the salmon fishery to respect tribal
treaty rights rivaled efforts of southern states to resist desegregation), vacated, Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 696 (1979).
11 See, e.g., Charles F. Wilkinson, To Feel the Summer in the Spring: The Treaty Fishing of the Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 WISC. L. REV. 375, 375–76 (1991).
12 Id.; Gabriel Chrisman, The Fish-in Protests at Franks Landing, THE SEATTLE CIVIL
RTS. & LAB. HIST. PROJECT, https://perma.cc/68JM-D5CT (last visited Apr. 18, 2020).
13 391 U.S. 392, 399 (1968) (“The overriding police power of the State, expressed in
nondiscriminatory measures for conserving fish resources, is preserved.”).
14 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
15 Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 400 (suggesting tribal rights are subject to the same regulations as all other fishing by non-tribal members).
16 Id. at 398.
17 Id. at 398–99 (“[T]he manner of fishing, the size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like may be regulated by the State in the interest of conservation,
provided the regulation meets the appropriate standards and does not discriminate
against the Indians.”).
18 See WILKINSON, supra note 3, at 166–72.

2020]

BEYOND THE BELLONI DECISION

391

and treaty rights and were integral in lighting the fuse of that
movement.19
In 1968, Sohappy and his fellow plaintiffs, who eventually joined
the United States and the tribes of the lower Columbia,20 filed a demand
for a federal court decree to define their treaty-reserved fishing rights in
Oregon.21 By doing so, the Sohappy v. Smith plaintiffs opened the door
to the modern era of tribal treaty rights, an era ushered in and defined
by Judge Belloni’s 1969 decision in Sohappy. Rather than adopting the
Supreme Court’s unworkable and zero sum Puyallup I concepts, Judge
Belloni approached Sohappy’s demand from a practical perspective,
acknowledging the well-established legal basis for treaty rights while
sketching a path forward demanding recognition of and equality for
their continuing—and perpetual—exercise.22 In rendering the Sohappy
decision, Judge Belloni recognized the importance of a broader view of
the interests at stake and demanded that the state decision-making also
expand beyond its own, narrower concerns.23 Finally and perhaps most
critically, Judge Belloni understood that neither the tribes nor the
states would disappear and, by retaining continuing jurisdiction and
calling on the defendant states to work cooperatively with the tribes, his
Sohappy decision created a new framework to support the ongoing
development of practical solutions.24 That framework eliminated the
existential threats posed by Puyallup I and, instead, shifted the focus to
specific details of how treaty rights would be exercised: how many fish
would be caught, by what means, at which locations, and subject to
oversight by whom. After Sohappy, the tribes could begin answering
those questions on an equal footing with states and do so with eyes
toward their own needs, values, and perspectives. Judge Belloni’s
Sohappy decision thereby announced the modern era of tribal treaty
rights and natural resources management by ensuring tribes could
continue to meaningfully exercise their rights according to their own
sovereign priorities. Thanks to that decision and the five decades of
subsequent decisions and hard work that built upon it, that modern era

19

See Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 903–04 (D. Or. 1969).
Id. at 904 (stating the United States filed a separate suit against the State of Oregon
“on its own behalf and on behalf of the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yak[a]ma
Reservation, the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Umatilla Reservation . . . , the Nez
Perce Indian Tribe, and ‘all other tribes similarly situated,’” in which the Warm Springs
Tribe, the Yakama Nation, and the Nez Perce Tribe intervened and which was ultimately
consolidated with the Sohappy case).
21 Id. at 903–04.
22 Id. at 911 (“In the case of regulations affecting Indian treaty fishing rights the protection of the treaty right to take fish at the Indians’ usual and accustomed places must be
an objective of the state’s regulatory policy co-equal with the conservation of fish runs for
other users.”).
23 Id. at 910 (“In considering the problem of salmon and steelhead conservation in the
Columbia River and its tributaries, it is necessary to consider the entire Columbia River
system.”).
24 Id. at 911–12.
20
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is now defined by the efforts and successes of Indian tribes and their
members to expand and protect their historic, treaty-reserved rights.
Sohappy came at a critical turning point in the development of
treaty rights jurisprudence and by virtue of his approach and analysis
in that decision, Judge Belloni connected the historical legal status of
treaties to the realities of their everyday exercise in the current day.
This Article marks the 50th anniversary of Judge Belloni’s decision in
Sohappy by detailing the importance of those connections and tracing
Judge Belloni’s influence across treaty rights litigation in the Great
Lakes. The scope of that influence and the ongoing usefulness and
importance of Sohappy’s framework demonstrates that, just as the
Supreme Court’s blanket endorsement of tribal sovereignty in the 1959
decision of Williams v. Lee25 marked the beginning of the modern era of
federal Indian law,26 Sohappy changed the course of history by
providing a firm platform from which tribes could exercise that
sovereignty to sustain their treaty reserved rights.
To support that argument, the Article begins with a brief review of
that historical legal status and the challenges presented by state efforts
to interfere with treaty rights, particularly in the mid-1900s. From
there, the Article details the novel approach utilized in Sohappy and
traces how that framework played out for the tribes of the Great Lakes.
While a series of judicial decisions in that region resulted in slightly
different approaches to the balance of state regulatory power and tribal
treaty rights, the concepts and perspectives announced by Judge Belloni
in Sohappy were instrumental in setting the stage for those approaches.
Despite the consistency across these decisions, however, the Article
concludes with a cautionary note stemming from recent Supreme Court
opinions that appear to pose a potential return to the unexamined
approach utilized by the Puyallup I court. Despite that potential, the
wisdom and power of Sohappy remain critically important for tribes and
their allies seeking to protect and expand their traditional treatyreserved rights and are likely to remain important in treaty right
challenges to come.
II. TREATIES: CONSTITUTIONAL PROMISES MEANT TO ENDURE (BUT STILL
SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION)
Treaties made by and between the United States and Indian tribes
have defined the terms of that relationship from the founding of the
federal government. Beyond that relationship, however, tribal treaties
have also helped inform basic principles inherent in the nature of our
constitutional republic. The Supreme Court’s resolution of the important
questions posed by tribal treaties and the rights reserved therein helped
set the stage for the modern era of tribal treaty rights ushered in by
Sohappy.
25
26

358 U.S. 217 (1959).
See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 1 (1987).
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Upon its founding, the United States acceded to a long tradition of
“linking arms together” with Indian nations by continuing to engage
with those nations through treaties.27 By the time the Constitution was
ratified, tribes were negotiating and entering treaties with European
colonial powers for over 175 years.28 The practice of reaching terms on a
government-to-government basis to serve the mutual interests of both
sovereigns was already well-accepted and represented an important and
ongoing bond rooted in ceremony, especially from the tribal
perspective.29
Given that long history, the critical national interests served by
treaty arrangements with native people, and the penchant for colonists
and their local interests to interfere with those commitments, it is not
surprising that the ratified Constitution included a provision ensuring
that the treaties made or yet to be made by the United States would be
the supreme law of the land.30 But, although the Supremacy Clause
establishes the primacy of treaties as a legal matter,31 it was not until
Chief Justice John Marshall began interpreting and applying that
clause in the context of treaties between the United States and the
Cherokee Nation that the true weight of Indian treaties became clear.32
The language of those solemn agreements helped define and invigorate
the constitutional federalism of the republic and establish the balance of
power—tipped entirely in favor of the federal government—with regard
to engaging in relations with Indian tribes.33 In reviewing the terms of
these agreements, Marshall made clear their import, not just to the
Cherokee Nation, who was seeking the protection of the United States
from the existential threats posed by Georgia, but also their role in the
early legislative identity and action of the United States.34 Those
important national purposes helped support Marshall’s conclusion that
the federal government and, importantly, his own Supreme Court, could
review and negate Georgia’s laws as “repugnant to the constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States.”35 From its earliest days,
27 See, e.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN
TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600–1800 at 121–23, 128–29 (1997).
28 See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 97
(7th ed. 2017) (“The first-ever formal treaty ceremony recorded between English colonists
and an Indian confederacy in North American occurred in 1608 at Powhatan’s seat of government . . . .”).
29 See WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 103.
30 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 536, 549–57 (1832) (reviewing treaty
provisions to conclude that “[t]he treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the
Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states; and provide that all intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the union.”).
33 See id. at 557.
34 Id. at 556–57 (“From the commencement of our government, congress has passed
acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties
stipulate.”).
35 Id. at 562.
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therefore, the United States depended on treaties with Indian nations
not only to serve its own national interests but also to engage and define
the terms of its own internal relations under the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the central role that Indian treaties played in
elucidating the details of the federal balance of power between the
federal government and the several states, conflicts between those
sovereigns over the scope and bounds of tribal relations continued. Less
than sixty years after Chief Justice Marshall’s resounding endorsement
of tribal treaties as instruments of federal protection insulated from
state interference, the Court famously noted the ongoing tension
between states and tribal nations, saying in United States v. Kagama36
that “[b]ecause of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where
[tribes] are found are often their deadliest enemies.” As a result, despite
expressions of federal interest and the supremacy of treaties under
federal law,37 conflict with states and local citizens persisted. The
Supreme Court was continually called upon to resolve these conflicts,
especially with regard to the exercise by tribal members of reserved
treaty rights.
The first of these significant decisions arose within twenty years of
the Court’s Kagama decision and began the Court’s long tradition of
resolving conflicts over the rights of tribes in the Pacific Northwest to
exercise their treaty reserved rights to take fish in their usual and
accustomed locations.38 Over the first half of the twentieth century,
these decisions laid an important legal foundation for the continuing
exercise of those rights by confirming their nature, scope, and existence.
In United States v. Winans, for example, the Court rejected the
argument that rights reserved by the Yakama Nation in an 1855 treaty
with the United States were abrogated by the admission of the State of
Washington to the Union.39 Central to the Court’s interpretation and
protection of the reserved right was its recognition that the treaty
“seemed to promise . . . and give the word of the Nation for more” than
just allowing Indians to exercise the same rights as other citizens of the
state.40 The Court recognized that the right to take fish at traditional
fishing locations was “part of larger rights possessed by the Indians,”
and that the “form of the [treaty] and its language was adapted” to
preserve the exercise of those rights, albeit “in common with the citizens
of the territory.”41 The Winans Court understood the importance of those
rights to the Yakama, calling them “not much less necessary to the
36

118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
Id.; U.S. CONST. art VI, para 2.
38 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 371 (1905) (decided approximately twenty
years after Kagama was decided in 1886).
39 Id. at 382–84.
40 Id. at 380; see also Michael C. Blumm & James Brunberg, “Not Much Less Necessary
than the Atmosphere They Breathed:” Salmon, Indian Treaties, and the Supreme Court—A
Centennial Remembrance of United States v. Winans and its Enduring Significance, 46
NAT. RES. J. 489, 491 (2006).
41 Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
37
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existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed,”42 and laid
a critical foundation for their continuing vitality even in the depths of
the dismal allotment and assimilation era.43
But, while upholding the continuing existence of rights guaranteed
through the treaty with the United States, Winans did not wrestle with
the nuances of Washington’s ability to control the exercise of those
rights and, if so, to what extent. Instead, the Winans Court dismissed
the state’s concern over the rights as a limitation on state sovereignty by
suggesting that the Treaty does not “restrain the State unreasonably, if
at all, in the regulation of the right.”44 The Court again picked up that
thread in deciding Tulee v. State of Washington45 in 1942, in which
another member of the Yakama Nation challenged Washington’s
attempts to force him to acquire a state fishing license in order to
exercise his treaty-reserved fishing rights. Washington asserted that its
“broad powers to conserve game and fish within its borders” authorized
state licensing authority over Mr. Tulee and similarly situated tribal
fishermen.46 While the Court rejected that specific requirement, saying
that it could not be “reconciled with a fair construction of the treaty,”
the Court, relying in part on its earlier statement in Winans, did
recognize a right of the state to “impose on Indians, equally with others,
such restrictions of a purely regulatory nature concerning the time and
manner of fishing outside the reservation as are necessary for the
conservation of fish.”47
With the encouragement of these words from the Supreme Court,
Washington continued its efforts to regulate tribal fishing in the
interests of conservation and, through state regulations, began
prohibiting precisely the manner of fishing in which members of the
Puyallup and Nisqually Tribes engaged: the setting of nets at the
mouths of rivers where salmon would migrate.48 By the time the
Supreme Court considered tribal challenges to these regulations in its
1968 Puyallup I decision, then, it was clear that Washington’s efforts to
regulate in the interests of conservation could completely frustrate, if
not prohibit, the exercise of treaty-reserved rights in contravention of
the Court’s long history of protecting the sanctity of those treaties from
state interference and the very foundations of federal Indian law.49 As
the Court’s negative treatment of other uniquely tribal rights has

42

Id.
The Court subsequently relied on Winans to recognize that the treaty reserved to
the Yakama rights to fish on both sides of the Columbia River in Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 198 (1919).
44 Winans, 198 U.S. at 384; see also Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 40, at 535–36.
45 315 U.S. 681, 682 (1942).
46 Id. at 683.
47 Id. at 684–85 (citations omitted).
48 Puyallup I, 391 U.S. 392, 395–96 (1968).
49 See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. 515, 552–57 (1832).
43
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demonstrated,50 facially neutral laws or regulations that serve other
state interests such as conservation tend to have narrow, direct, and
disparate impact on Indian tribes and their members. But, with Winans’
one-sentence recognition of the possibility of state regulatory authority
over the exercise of treaty rights, bolstered by Tulee’s expansion of that
concept, the Court strode boldly forward, determining that “the manner
of fishing, the size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and
the like may be regulated by the State in the interest of conservation,
provided the regulation meets appropriate standards and does not
discriminate against the Indians.”51 The Court did determine that the
state’s regulation measures must be “reasonable and necessary” in the
interests of conservation but, given the lack of clarity around those
standards, refused to decide whether the prohibition on tribal net
fishing met those requirements.52
By the summer of 1968, therefore, the status and continuing
viability of treaty-reserved rights to fish, particularly in the Pacific
Northwest, remained unsettled. Despite the Supreme Court’s tradition
of solicitude for the import of the promises made by the United States,53
the increasing pressure of conflicting state interests and attempts to
control tribal member fishing on the same basis as all other citizens of
the state convinced the Court to open the door to unprecedented state
power to limit or even prevent the exercise of the rights reserved in
those promises.54 A century and a half after Chief Justice Marshall
relied on tribal treaties to establish the unique and exclusive federaltribal relationship and invalidate state attempts to interfere therein,
Puyallup I provided a broad and nebulous basis for precisely such state
interference.55 Meanwhile, tribal members continued to fish in reliance
on the supremacy of their treaty-reserved rights.56 Two such members of
the Yakama Nation, Richard and David Sohappy, were arrested for
doing so in the summer of 1968 and, along with a dozen of their fellow
tribal members, asked the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon
to resolve the interplay of these seemingly conflicted legal
interpretations.57

50 See, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of “neutrally, generally applicable laws” even where such laws interfered with the
individual religious beliefs of practitioners of the Native American Church).
51 Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 398.
52 Id. at 401–02.
53 See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. at 549–57; Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 382, 384 (1905).
54 See, e.g., Tulee, 315 U.S. 681, 683–84 (1942); Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 398.
55 Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 398–400.
56 See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text.
57 Michael C. Blumm & Cari Baermann, The Belloni Decision and its Legacy: United
States v. Oregon and its Far-Reaching Effects After a Half-Century, 50 ENVTL. L. 347, 360–
63 (2020) (discussing Puyallup I).
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III. TURNING THE TIDE: THE SOHAPPY DECISION
Like its neighbor to the north, Oregon engaged in numerous efforts
to regulate and control the exercise of tribal treaty rights. In a statute
dating back to 1901, for example, Oregon had closed a portion of the
Columbia River to fishing by any means other than angling, thereby
putting tribal members who used traditional fishing methods such as
nets at risk of arrest by state officers.58 Similarly, the state’s game and
fish commissions exercised “broad authority to regulate the times,
places and manner of taking fish” as well as the rules regarding
possession of fish, oftentimes upon the presumption that all fishermen,
whether tribal or not, must be treated equally.59 While the Sohappy
plaintiffs, which included tribal members, various tribes, and the United
States,60 did not dispute that the state, pursuant to Puyallup I, had
some authority to regulate “the manner of fishing, the size of the take,
the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like may be regulated by
the State in the interest of conservation,”61 they contended that such
power was much more limited than the manner in which Oregon had
been exercising it.62 Thus, the Sohappy plaintiffs sought a decree that
would define the nature of their treaty reserved rights, cabin state
authority to interfere with those rights, and result in a workable
outcome that might avoid the arrests and harassment that continued
through the late 1960s and early 1970s.63
Oregon urged Judge Belloni to reject that attempt and, instead,
insisted that the relevant treaty language guaranteed to the tribes only
those rights equally available to all other state citizens.64 Based on that
interpretation, the state viewed its regulation of tribal fishermen on the
same basis as its statewide efforts to promote conservation of dwindling
salmon and steelhead populations as well as the state’s own sport and
commercial fishing industries.65 In other words, Oregon argued that its
regulatory power was applied equally across all those accessing and
utilizing the fishery resource and that the treaties required nothing
more, particularly in light of the treaty language suggesting that tribal
rights would be exercised “in common with the citizens” of the
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Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. 899, 908 (D. Or. 1969).
Id. at 906–08.
60 Id. at 903–04.
61 Puyallup I, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968).
62 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 906–07.
63 Id. at 903–04, 907 (urging Judge Belloni to require that the 1) state preliminarily
establish a reasonable and necessary conservation purpose before seeking to regulate treaty fishing; 2) state’s regulatory agencies treat tribal fishing differently from non-Indian
fishing; and 3) state regulations allow treaty fishermen to take “a fair and equitable share”
of the fish).
64 Id. at 904–05.
65 See id. at 910–11 (“Oregon recognizes sports fishermen and commercial fishermen
and seems to attempt to make an equitable division between the two.”).
59
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territory.66 In the state’s view, its regulatory authority was supreme and
available to serve state interests, regardless of tribal rights.67
Judge Belloni quickly and with memorable flourish dismissed the
state’s position, suggesting that it would be tenable only “if all history,
anthropology, biology, prior case law and the intention of the parties to
the treaty were to be ignored.”68 But Judge Belloni’s decision in Sohappy
went well beyond his colorful rejection of Oregon’s equal access/equal
application arguments. Through his thoughtful and prescient approach
acknowledging both the supremacy of the tribes’ treaty rights and the
challenges posed by the murky avenues for state regulation authorized
in Winans, Tulee, and Puyallup I, Judge Belloni developed three key
concepts that continue to define judicial approaches to the balance of
state authority and the exercise of tribal treaty rights. First, the
Sohappy decision rejected a zero-sum approach and accepted the
permanence of both state sovereignty and treaty rights; a perspective
that forced the development of practical and perpetual accommodations
for balancing these competing principles and avoided an all-or-nothing
result. Second, Judge Belloni developed such a workable approach
through his deeper understanding of the nature of state regulations and
his avoidance of the broad and largely conceptual directions from earlier
Supreme Court decisions. Finally, in conjunction with each of those
foregoing perspectives, Judge Belloni recognized the need for continuing
and dynamic solutions that would adapt to the changing needs of the
states, tribes, and resources without demanding an overly formalistic or
rigid answer.
A. The Permanence of States and Tribes
While looking back from the current era of prominent tribal
sovereignty may provide a different perspective, just fifty years ago,
tribes, treaties, and tribal governments within the United States still
faced an uncertain future. Though most tribes had survived the federal
government’s termination era, over one-hundred tribes were in fact
terminated, with devastating and long-lasting impacts on their status
and members.69 And, although tribal leaders had begun to sway federal
policies closer to tribal priorities in both the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations, it was not until 1970 that President Nixon’s statement
to Congress formally rejected the termination policy and endorsed a new

66 See, e.g., Treaty with the Yakama Tribe, Yakama Tribe-U.S., art. III, June 9, 1855,
12 Stat. 951; Treaty with the Indians in Middle Oregon, Indians in Middle Oregon-U.S.,
art. I, June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 963; Treaty with the Walla-Walla, Walla-Walla TribeUmatilla Tribe-U.S., art. I, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 945; Treaty with the Nez Perces, Nez
Perce Indians-U.S., art. III, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957.
67 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp at 907.
68 Id. at 905.
69 Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 151–54 (1977).
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era of tribal self-determination.70 Thus, while momentum was swinging
toward the continued and expanding exercise of tribal sovereignty, the
staying power of that swing was by no means assured when Sohappy
was decided.
That uncertain future reflected a long history of federal policies
premised on the demise or disappearance of tribes and any associated
treaty rights. Since the earliest days of the republic, the nation’s
founding fathers indicated a preference for removing tribes from conflict
with non-Indian settlers under the presumption that, over time, tribal
lands, people, and identities would be absorbed and subsumed within
the broader American experience.71 Those beliefs were incorporated into
early federal policies and, in many ways, motivated the federal
government’s treaty negotiation strategy and overall relationship with
tribes.72
During the assimilation and allotment era of the late 1800s and
early 1900s, federal policy was expressly premised on eliminating tribes
and tribal cultures, with the entire might of the burgeoning American
empire aimed directly at dispossessing Indian lands, destroying cultural
connections, and severing tribal traditions and family ties.73 While
considering the Winans case in 1905 at the height of that assault, the
Supreme Court may have had a much different view on the future
vitality of the rights that they were upholding.74 Perhaps that Court’s
passing acknowledgment of state regulatory authority was in
recognition of widespread view of the time that tribal members would
ultimately be treated on the same basis as all other state citizens. Aside
from that possibility, the long history of federal policies premised on the
disappearance of tribes and their treaties would certainly provide a
basis for upholding broader state authority over tribal members.
But Judge Belloni rejected that history and, instead, emphasized
both the constitutional supremacy and true nature of the treaties at
issue in Sohappy.75 The decision describes that the agreements are “not
70 See, e.g., Lyndon B. Johnson, The Forgotten American, 4 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
438, 440 (Mar. 6, 1968) (“I propose, in short, a policy of maximum choice for the American
Indian: a policy expressed in programs of self-help, self-development, self-determination.”);
RICHARD NIXON, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN POLICY, H.R. DOC. NO. 91-363, at 3
(1970); 116 CONG. REC. SEN. 23,258 (1970) (“Federal termination errs in one direction,
Federal paternalism errs in the other. Only by clearly rejecting both of these extremes can
we achieve a policy which truly serves the best interests of the Indian people. Selfdetermination among the Indian people can and must be encouraged without the threat of
eventual termination.”).
71 See, e.g., Letter from George Washington, Commander-in-Chief, to James Duane,
Head of the Committee of Indian Affairs of the Continental Congress, (Sept. 7, 1783), reprinted in GETCHES ET AL., supra note 28, at 99–100.
72 See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 28, at 101.
73 Id. at 194–99.
74 Even artistic renditions of Native people during this era, such as James Earle Frazer’s (in)famous “end of the trail” sculpture, suggested their impending demise. See, e.g.,
Rennard Strickland, Indian Law and the Miner’s Canary: The Signs of Poison Gas, 39
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483, 486 (1991).
75 See Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. 899, 905 (1969).
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treaties of conquest but [instead] were negotiated at arm’s length,” and
notes that, by 1969, all of the parties to the treaties agreed as to their
meaning.76 Judge Belloni went on to restate the essential canon of
treaty interpretation, that treaty language is to be read as the tribes
would have understood it and that the rights reserved in the treaties
were essential to the tribes—their consent to the terms of the
negotiation would not have been secured without the promises
regarding fishing.77 Though the Supreme Court had approached its
Puyallup I decision in a similar “spirit,”78 the majority quickly turned to
dissecting the treaty language without regard for any tribal
understanding of it or mention of the importance of those rights to the
tribes.79
By beginning his analysis from a faithful application of the
foundations of federal Indian and tribal treaty jurisprudence, Judge
Belloni dispelled any notion that the state could ultimately eliminate or
even substantially diminish the constitutionally supreme and inherently
integral treaty rights that he was being urged to protect. Instead, with
those principles as his starting point, successfully resolving Sohappy
would demand a new solution that could accommodate both the status of
those rights and the potential regulatory authority of the state
recognized through passing statements in Winans and Tulee and
wholeheartedly endorsed by Puyallup I.80
B. Practical Solutions
Importantly, rather than just rely on the broad and conceptual
statements of those Supreme Court decisions, Judge Belloni sought to
provide more practical and workable guidance to the Sohappy parties.
To begin that process, Judge Belloni distilled the rather ambiguous
language of Puyallup I into three more concrete guidelines: “First, the
regulation must be ‘necessary for the conservation of the fish.’ Second,
the state restrictions on Indian treaty fishing must ‘not discriminate
against the Indians.’ And third, they must meet ‘appropriate
standards.’”81 Analyzing Oregon’s existing statutory and regulatory
measures against this rubric, Judge Belloni determined that the state’s
76

Id.
Id. at 905–06.
78 Puyallup I, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968).
79 See id. (“But the manner in which the fishing may be done and its purpose, whether
or not commercial, are not mentioned in the Treaty. We would have quite a different case
if the Treaty had preserved the right to fish at the ‘usual and accustomed places’ in the
‘usual and accustomed’ manner. But the Treaty is silent as to the mode or modes of fishing
that are guaranteed. Moreover, the right to fish at those respective places is not an exclusive one. Rather, it is one ‘in common with all citizens of the Territory.’ Certainly the right
of the latter may be regulated. And we see no reason why the right of the Indians may not
also be regulated by an appropriate exercise of the police power of the State.”).
80 Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384 (1905); Tulee, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942); Puyallup I, 391
U.S. at 398.
81 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 907.
77
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efforts met none of those guidelines, holding instead that state
standards were too broad to be necessary for conservation purposes,82
discriminated against the Indians by virtue of a complete lack of
consideration of their treaty rights,83 and failed to meet appropriate
standards for protecting those rights.84 Instead of leaving the decision
there, however, Judge Belloni presented additional guidance to help the
parties progress toward a more appropriate balancing of state interests
and tribal rights.
With regard to the availability of state regulations in the interests
of conservation, for example, Judge Belloni instructed that, although the
state retains broad authority over non-Indians to serve its regulatory
objectives, “it does not have the same latitude” over tribal rights.85
Rather, “[t]he state may not qualify th[at] federal right by subordinating
it to some other state objective or policy.”86 The state must instead
demonstrate both the need to limit the take of fish and the necessity of
the particular regulation upon the exercise of the treaty right before
pursuing such regulations.87 Beyond its own regulatory objectives,
therefore, the “treaty right to take fish . . . must [also] be an objective of
the state’s regulatory policy co-equal with the conservation of fish runs
for other users.”88
In addition, Judge Belloni directed that the state consider the
entire Columbia River system in the context of determining its
regulatory approach and “must manage the over-all fish run in a way
that does not discriminate against the treaty Indians as it has
heretofore been doing.”89 That determination would ensure that the
tribal members, with “an absolute right to th[e] fishery” get the “fair
share of fish produced by the Columbia River system” to which their
treaties entitle them.90
Finally, with regard to the development of new state rules and
regulations, Judge Belloni insisted that the tribes be duly informed of
and represented in the state’s decision making process.91 Although
Sohappy did not result in a requirement that the state secure tribal
consent for its management of the fishery resource, Judge Belloni
82

Id. at 908.
Id. at 910.
84 Id. at 911.
85 Id. at 908.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 908–09.
88 Id. at 911.
89 Id. at 910.
90 Id. at 911.
91 Id. at 912 (“The state must recognize that the federal right which the Indians have
is distinct from the fishing rights of others over which the state has a broader latitude of
regulatory control and that the tribal entities are interested parties to any regulation affecting the treaty fishing right. They, as well as their members to whom the regulations
will be directly applicable, are entitled to be heard on the subject and, consistent with the
need for dealing with emergency or changing situations on short notice, to be given appropriate notice and opportunity to participate meaningfully in the rule-making process.”).
83
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foresaw and demanded recognition by the state of the unique tribal
perspective on those issues.92
With these determinations, Judge Belloni set the stage for a more
effective and responsive state regulatory structure that better aligned
with the foundational role of treaties and treaty rights in the American
legal system. Instead of simply dealing with these complex issues on
that conceptual basis, however, Judge Belloni gave clear and practical
instructions to the parties that would help guide them toward a more
appropriate and functional future relationship.93 In further recognition
of the challenges presented by effectuating those instructions, Judge
Belloni also set forth avenues for resolving further disagreements.
C. Resources for Future Disputes
By taking a more holistic and practical approach than his
predecessors who faced these conflicts, Judge Belloni understood the
need for a dynamic and adaptable solution that could continue to evolve
with the changing environment and needs of the parties. The Sohappy
decision recognized that the reality of attempting to regulate a largely
anadromous fishery necessarily meant that conditions on the ground
would change as greater or fewer fish traversed the Columbia River
system.94 He also realized that requiring an equitable share for tribal
fishermen and mandating state consideration of tribal treaty rights as a
co-equal regulatory objective would place new and previously
unconsidered demands on the state, which would likely result in
additional but unpredictable challenges and conflicts.95 Therefore, in a
prescient stroke that would continue to pay dividends for the parties to
the case, Judge Belloni retained continuing jurisdiction over the case, a
status that continues to the present day.96 That status has proven to
fulfill Judge Belloni’s prediction that ongoing judicial oversight would
“be the only way of assuring the parties an opportunity for timely and
effective judicial review of [regulatory] restrictions should such review
become necessary.”97
In an effort to potentially avoid the need for such additional review,
Judge Belloni suggested that the parties work together to accommodate
their interests on a cooperative basis.98 Although he noted that tribal
consent to state regulations was not required, he stressed that
“agreements with the tribes or deference to tribal preference or
regulation on specific aspects pertaining to the exercise of treaty fishing
92

See id.
See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
94 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 911.
95 See id.
96 Id. Although the court’s jurisdiction continues, recent decisions have administratively closed the matter for reasons unknown to the parties. See Blumm & Baermann, supra
note 57, at 370–71, 381.
97 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 911; see also Blumm & Baermann, supra note 57, at 380.
98 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 912.
93
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rights are means which the state may adopt in the exercise of its
jurisdiction,” and he encouraged the state and the tribes to do so.99
Perhaps more than any other of Sohappy’s important holdings, this
encouragement reflected the potential and desire for a new and more
progressive era of state–tribal relations regarding the exercise of treaty
rights. Far from the “deadliest enemies” conception of the late 1800s,100
and more effective than relying on the Supreme Court to sketch only
conceptual boundaries for that relationship, Judge Belloni’s call for a
(state)government–to–(tribal)government–to–(federal)government
cooperative approach brought together his due regard for tribal treaties
and sovereignty, his guidance to the parties to reach practical solutions,
and his hope that the future would bring progress toward those ends. As
subsequent litigation over treaty rights in the Great Lakes region
demonstrates, other courts would soon follow Judge Belloni’s lead to
resolving these challenges.101
IV. SOHAPPY FEELING ‘SUMMER IN THE SPRING’102
On September 28th, 1971, A.B. LeBlanc, a member of the Bay Mills
Indian Community, took his boat about 300 yards out into Lake
Superior and set his nets to catch some fish.103 LeBlanc was soon
confronted by state natural resources officials who informed him that he
was illegally fishing in waters closed to commercial fishing according to
Michigan’s 1929 Commercial Fishing Act and offered to provide LeBlanc
with a copy of that state law.104 LeBlanc responded that he had a copy of
the 1836 treaty between the United States and the Chippewa and
Ottawa Indians that he would also be happy to provide to the state
officials.105
Although LeBlanc’s arrest and citation for illegally fishing under
Michigan law was not the first such legal challenge regarding Chippewa
treaty rights in the Great Lakes,106 it marked the first time that courts
of the Great Lakes region began to wrestle with the complexity of the
supremacy of Indian treaties and state attempts to regulate the exercise
of those rights.107 The Sohappy framework announced by Judge Belloni
99

Id.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
101 See United States v. Oregon, 769 F.2d 1410, 1412 (9th Cir. 1985).
102 See Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 375.
103 Michigan
Indians in Fishing Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 1971),
https://perma.cc/W7VZ-DDD9.
104 Id.
105 Id. For consistency with historic treaties and to avoid confusion, this Article uses the
term Chippewa in lieu of Ojibwe or Anishinaabe.
106 See, e.g., People v. Chosa, 233 N.W. 205 (Mich. 1930) (upholding state convictions of
tribal treaty hunters), overruled by People v. Jondreau, 185 N.W.2d 375 (Mich. 1971).
107 In Jondreau, the Michigan Supreme Court relied on the supremacy of treaties and
State v. Arthur, 261 P.2d 135 (Idaho 1953), in denying any state regulatory power over the
exercise of tribal treaty rights, and suggested that if conservation issues became a concern,
the terms of the 1854 treaty at issue, which allowed for the President of the United States
100
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would play a critical role in how those courts ultimately addressed those
challenges.
Like the tribes of the Pacific Northwest, the various bands of the
Chippewa entered into a series of treaties with the United States,
pursuant to which the bands ceded wide swaths of territory across the
entire Great Lakes region.108 Though negotiating in an earlier era and a
different context, the Chippewa, like the tribes of the Pacific Northwest,
insisted on treaty language that would leave in place their time-honored
lifeways across the waters and lands of their territory.109 While
subsequent decades would subject them to immense pressure, loss of
land, assimilation, and the onslaught of state authority,110 the bands of
the Chippewa and their members across the upper Midwest would
maintain and eventually assert those treaty-reserved rights as a means
to protect their own traditions and enhance their individual and
collective sovereignty.
In considering the state’s attempt to prosecute Mr. LeBlanc, the
Michigan Supreme Court began by applying the time-honored canons of
treaty construction to interpret the treaty language at issue there.
Based on those principles, the court determined that the 1836 Treaty
reserved the right for the Chippewa to fish in the Great Lakes even
though fishing was not expressly mentioned by the treaty’s language.111
Even with that interpretation, however, Michigan still insisted that its
laws applied to Mr. LeBlanc; a proposition that the court noted, “has
been the subject of a good deal of controversy.”112 Like Judge Belloni in
Sohappy, the Michigan Supreme Court considered the U.S. Supreme
Court’s consideration of state authority in Tulee and Puyallup I but,
ultimately, looked for additional guidance from subsequent decisions,
like the Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in Antoine v. Washington,113 to
“help[ ] clarify” that precedent.114 Ultimately, however, the Michigan
to “issue an order limiting or extinguishing the hunting and fishing rights of the Indians,”
could provide a remedy. Jondreau, 185 N.W.2d at 380–81.
108 See, e.g., Treaty with the Chippewa, Chippewa of Michigan-U.S., art. I, May 9, 1836,
7 Stat. 503; Treaty with the Chippewa at St. Peter’s, Chippewa Nation of Indians-U.S.,
art. I, July 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 536; Treaty with the Chippewa at La Pointe Of Lake Superior,
Chippewa of Lake Superior and Mississippi-U.S., art I, Oct. 4, 1842, 7 Stat. 591; Treaty
with the Chippewa, Chippewa of Lake Superior and Mississippi-U.S., art I, Sept. 30, 1854,
10 Stat. 1109; see also Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 383–85 (describing the treaty negotiations and the sophistication with which the Chippewa approached them).
109 See Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 387–88; see, e.g., Treaty with the Chippewa at St.
Peter’s, supra note 108, at art. V (“The privilege of hunting, fishing, and gathering the
wild rice, upon the lands, the rivers and the lakes included in the territory ceded, is guarantied [sic] to the Indians, during the pleasure of the President of the United States.”).
110 Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 389–93.
111 People v. LeBlanc, 248 N.W.2d 199, 204–05 (Mich. 1976).
112 Id. at 212.
113 Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 207 (1975) (Puyallup I’s “‘appropriate standards’ requirement means that the State must demonstrate that its regulation is a reasonable and necessary conservation measure . . . and that its application to the Indians is
necessary in the interest of conservation.’”) (citations omitted).
114 LeBlanc, 248 N.W.2d at 214.
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Supreme Court relied on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit’s 1975 decision in United States v. Washington,115 which it
called “significant in . . . help[ing] define when a state regulation is
necessary and when such regulation is discriminatory,” and cited
Sohappy as “another case taking the approach used in United States v.
Washington.”116 From that guidance, then, the court determined that
Michigan’s prohibition on gill nets could be applicable to Mr. LeBlanc
and his fellow tribal members if and only if: 1) that prohibition “is
necessary for the preservation of the fish protected by the regulation; 2)
[its] application . . . to the Chippewas is necessary for the preservation
of the fish protected; 3) and the regulation does not discriminate against
the Chippewas.”117
By adopting that basic framework, the Michigan Supreme Court
provided a foundation for future decisions to flesh out the complicated
relationship between Chippewa treaty rights and state regulatory
efforts. Just five years after People v. LeBlanc, for example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the Michigan
Supreme Court’s reasoning wholesale, saying that LeBlanc “accurately
states the rule of reason and the principles of federal law applicable” to
the balance of state authority and tribal treaty rights.118 The Sixth
Circuit went on to say that, when applying LeBlanc’s three factors and
considering whether state regulation is necessary, the burden is on the
state “to show by clear and convincing evidence that it is highly
probable that irreparable harm will occur and that the need for
regulation exists.”119
Like Mr. LeBlanc and the legal challenges brought by tribes and
the United States in Michigan, the Chippewa of Wisconsin also began
asserting their treaty rights more forcefully in the early 1970s.120 In a
1972 decision regarding Wisconsin’s attempt to prosecute tribal
members for exercising treaty-reserved fishing rights, for example, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, like the Michigan Supreme Court, upheld
the continuing vitality of those rights but remanded for further
consideration of whether state regulations might be “reasonable and
necessary to prevent a substantial depletion of the fish supply” and
whether such regulations might also be “necessary in the exercise of
other valid police powers.”121 Thereafter, the Lac Courte Oreilles Band
115

520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
LeBlanc, 248 N.W.2d at 215. The court apparently did not recognize that Sohappy
preceded the Ninth Circuit’s decision by six years, making it the foundational decision of
its preferred approach.
117 Id. at 215.
118 United States v. Michigan, 653 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1981).
119 Id.
120 As Wilkinson notes, while improved access to lawyers through legal services programs was key to this broader movement, it began with tribal leaders across the country
reaching “a consensus that the terrible descent since the treaties and allotment must be
halted and reversed.” Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 396–97.
121 State v. Gurnoe, 192 N.W.2d 892, 902 (Wis. 1972).
116
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of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (LCO) brought a declaratory
judgement action against various Wisconsin officials to confirm the
existence and status of their treaty rights across the state, a case that
was consolidated with actions by the United States to protect various
property interests of the Chippewa established pursuant to their
treaties.122 Like the Sohappy litigation, this action began a decades-long
journey through the federal courts of Wisconsin, and, to resolve the
balance of state authority and tribal treaty rights across the state, those
courts would come to rely on Judge Belloni’s approach.
The early decisions in the LCO treaty rights saga focused on treaty
interpretation and whether subsequent treaties or other federal actions
invalidated or otherwise affected the rights guaranteed by the 1837 and
1842 agreements. In the first of these decisions, for example, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered the canons of treaty
interpretation,123 analyzed the terms of the treaties,124 acknowledged
the similar approaches of the Michigan Supreme Court in LeBlanc and
the Sixth Circuit,125 and concluded that the LCO’s treaty reserved rights
remained effective, at least upon portions of their ceded lands that were
not privately owned.126 The case was then remanded “for further
consideration as to the permissible scope of state regulation over the
LCO’s exercise of their usufructuary rights.”127 Though the matter’s
next trip to the appellate court focused on other issues, the court still
took the opportunity to make clear that the extent of state authority
would need careful analysis going forward.128
Following that direction, the district court issued a preliminary
decision adopting the conservation basis for state regulation but called
for more detailed briefing and a second phase of the litigation
specifically focused on the question of state authority.129 After receiving
briefing on the proper legal standards for considering state regulatory
authority, the district court issued a sweeping and detailed opinion
outlining the standards it would apply.130 Though differing in a key
122 See United States v. Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316, 1321–22 (W.D. Wis. 1978), rev’d
LCO v. Voigt (LCO I), 700 F.2d 341, 365 (7th Cir. 1983).
123 LCO I, 700 F.2d at 350–51.
124 Id. at 354–57.
125 Id. at 357.
126 Id. at 365.
127 Id.
128 LCO v. Wisconsin (LCO II), 760 F.2d 177, 183 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e make it clear on
remand that to which we adverted only by implication because it was not the focus of this
Court’s attention on the first appeal, namely that the usufructuary rights might be subject
to some conservation regulations. While the LCO’s in the exercise of their rights are relieved of licensing requirements and no doubt from other restrictions, nevertheless we
think that public policy which would benefit the Indians as well as all others might well
enter into the picture. We doubt that extinction of species or even wholesale slaughter or a
substantial detriment to the public safety is a reasonable adjunct to the rights reserved by
the Indians. These matters again can best be determined by appropriate exploration by
the district court.”) (citations omitted).
129 LCO v. Wisconsin (LCO III), 653 F. Supp. 1420, 1435 (W.D. Wis. 1987).
130 LCO v. Wisconsin (LCO IV), 668 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (W.D. Wis. 1987).
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respect, the district court’s conclusions largely adopted Sohappy and
Judge Belloni’s treatment of similar questions in that litigation.131
Relying on Sohappy, for example, the court made clear that Wisconsin’s
authority to regulate in the interest of conservation must be based on
specific facts showing such regulation is essential to protect the species
of concern.132 Similarly, drawing on a subsequent decision regarding the
plans called for by Judge Belloni,133 the court required that state
regulations be “the least restrictive alternative available,” which “would
accord with the tribes’ understanding at the time of the treaties.”134
But the court refused to limit state regulation to solely conservation
purposes, saying that the treaty rights at issue in the Great Lakes
region are different from those in the Northwest and, “extend to dozens
or even hundreds of resources.”135 Therefore, the court allowed that the
state could regulate tribal treaty rights “only in certain narrowly
defined circumstances” such as where such regulations might be
“necessary to prevent or ameliorate a substantial risk to the public
health or safety.”136 Even then, however, just as Judge Belloni said in
Sohappy, treaty rights “may not be subordinated to every state objective
or policy.”137
Finally, the court allowed that tribal regulations may preclude
state regulations, provided the tribal efforts at self-regulation “address
legitimate state concerns in the areas of conservation of resources and
public health and safety,” along with acceptable procedures regarding
enforcement and cooperation with the state.138 Like Judge Belloni’s view
of a more cooperative future, the court indicated it could help ensure
that the state and tribe work together, including through the potential
ordering of “a joint tribal-state natural resources commission.”139
Thus, with the exception of the possibility of state regulation in the
interests of public safety, the district court’s comprehensive analysis
and consideration of these issues largely tracked the Sohappy
framework.140 Like that decision, LCO IV envisioned the permanence of
state interests and tribal treaty rights but developed practical and
considered guidance for their long-term coexistence; guidance that
substantially limited the state’s regulatory power. Also, just as Judge
Belloni encouraged intergovernmental cooperation among Oregon and
the tribes of the Columbia River, the district court used the LCO IV
decision to prompt deeper consideration of joint state-tribal
collaboration through a more formally ordered natural resources
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

See id. at 1235–36.
Id.
See United States v. Oregon, 769 F.2d 1410, 1412–13 (9th Cir. 1985).
LCO IV, 668 F. Supp. at 1236.
Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1238–39.
Id. at 1238 (citing Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. 899, 908 (1969)).
Id. at 1242.
Id.
See id.
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commission. Finally, just as Judge Belloni retained jurisdiction to
continue to review and address issues arising after Sohappy, the
Western District of Wisconsin continued to hear challenges related to
the LCO litigation.
Just like developments in the district of Oregon after Sohappy, the
Wisconsin federal court’s approach led to significant and timely progress
by the state and tribes. Just two years after LCO IV, the court took up
the specific issue of fishing regulations applicable to the take of walleye
and muskellunge and described the results of that progress, specifically
highlighting the benefit of state–tribal agreements.141 The court then
went on to largely uphold tribal efforts to regulate their own members in
the take of those fish species, provided the tribal regulations were
sufficiently detailed to accommodate for biological conditions that would
ensure conservation.142
Like the conflicts in Michigan and Wisconsin, the Chippewa in
present-day Minnesota also sought to assert and protect their treaty
141

Chief Judge Barbara Crabb was quite complimentary of both parties:

[w]hat the parties in this case have done to give practical effect to plaintiffs’ judicially recognized treaty rights is a remarkable story.
....
It is to this state’s credit that its officials did not adopt the recalcitrant attitude of
the State of Washington, but chose instead to work to adjust the state’s resource
management programs to accommodate the newly-recognized rights of the tribes.
The effort has not been an easy one. The court orders provided no real guidance for
translating a treaty right into a harvest opportunity. . . .
The department has negotiated a number of interim agreements with the tribes
covering the harvesting not only of walleye and muskellunge, but other species of
fish, deer, small game, migratory birds, bear, and wild rice. . . .
It is to the tribes’ credit that they have adopted an equally cooperative attitude toward the implementation of their rights. It has not been an easy time for them, either. The tribes and their members have been subjected to physical and verbal
abuse over the recognition of their treaty rights, most publicly when they have attempted to exercise their treaty rights to spearfish, but not only then. Harassment
has become a fact of life for them.
Tribal members have negotiated and entered into a series of interim agreements
with the state that have circumscribed their rights to accommodate state concerns,
despite their understandable impatience to reap the benefits of treaty rights they
have been forced to forgo for so many years.
....
Both the tribes and the officials of the State of Wisconsin responsible for implementing the tribes’ treaty rights can take pride in their accomplishments over the
last six years. They deserve widespread recognition and appreciation for their efforts.
LCO v. Wisconsin (LCO VI), 707 F. Supp. 1034, 1052–54 (W.D. Wis. 1989).
Though specific to the parties’ work in Wisconsin, the cooperative development of management plans in the Pacific Northwest is entitled to similar praise. See Blumm & Baermann, supra note 57, at 376–79.
142 Id. at 1060.
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rights there. The Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa and various tribal
members filed suit in 1990 to secure those rights and were eventually
joined in that effort by the United States and additional tribes with
treaty rights applicable in that state.143 With the benefit of relying on
precedent generated by the prior approaches of their fellow tribal
members in Michigan and Wisconsin,144 the Mille Lacs’ case provided a
forum for the plaintiff tribes and the defendant state agencies to work
together on agreeable standards and protocols for the oversight and
regulation of tribal member hunting and fishing.145 Like in Wisconsin,
the parties’ “commendabl[e]”146 efforts to cooperatively resolve those
challenges came up short in some respects, leaving federal court to
prescribe the boundaries of state authority.147 Once again, the Sohappy
framework proved appropriate and, despite Minnesota’s attempt to
reinterpret that case to support an argument for unilateral state
authority over harvest levels,148 that court ultimately determined that
state had not met its burden to demonstrate that any regulation of
tribal treaty rights was necessary for conservation purposes,
particularly in light of the sufficiency of the code, management plan,
and supporting materials developed by the Bands and applicable to the
exercise of those rights by their members.149
While conflicts over the details and boundaries of the exercise of
tribal treaty rights would continue, including increasing conflicts over
the allocation of scarce resources, the framework built upon Sohappy
and laid down in these cases provided a solid basis from which the court
could resolve those questions.150 Like Judge Belloni, and guided by his
thoughtful perspective, the state and federal judges considering these
complicated questions in the Great Lakes region contemplated the
ongoing relationship between tribal and state interests and, rather than
accepting the historical misconception that the tribal presence would be
temporary, developed workable guidance for accommodating both. While
the legitimacy of state regulation of treaty rights is arguably
inconsistent with the clear import of the Constitution’s supremacy
143 Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 952 F. Supp. 1362, 1365–66 (D.
Minn. 1997).
144 See id. at 1374–75.
145 See id. at 1366–67.
146 Id. at 1372.
147 See id. at 1368–69 (describing “unresolved” issues including the state’s assertion of
unilateral authority to determine harvestable surplus levels and that those determinations are not judicially reviewable and whether state prohibitions on night hunting and
gillnetting in certain lakes were necessary for conservation).
148 Id. at 1373.
149 Id. at 1374–75 (harvestable surplus issue); id. at 1382 (hunting); id. at 1384 (gillnetting); id. at 1385 (all regulatory issues).
150 See, e.g., LCO v. Wisconsin (LCO VII), 740 F. Supp. 1400, 1421–22 (W.D. Wis. 1990)
(“Therefore, I conclude as I have throughout this phase of the litigation that the state may
regulate for the purposes of conservation or for public safety, but only if it meets its burden
of demonstrating the need for the particular proposed regulatory measure.”) (emphasis
added); LCO v. Wisconsin, 769 F.3d 543, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2014).
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clause and Chief Justice Marshall’s emphasis on treaties as the basis for
an exclusive federal–tribal relationship,151 Sohappy’s model ensured
that such state authority would be limited and appropriate only where
the state could meet a high burden to demonstrate its necessity. Those
limitations would leave substantial room for tribes to assume the
primary responsibility for exercising their sovereign prerogatives over
their members’ treaty-reserved activities. With that model’s recognition
of tribal permanence, workable guidance, and additional resources for
further collaboration or dispute resolution, tribes have rapidly built
some of the leading natural resource and wildlife management systems
in the nation and continue to build upon their sovereign capacities and
capabilities.152
Despite the success of those efforts and the power of the current
tribal sovereignty movement they are engendering, recent decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court, though upholding the sanctity of treaty
reserved rights, may portend a reassessment of Judge Belloni’s
approach.
V. CONCLUSION: THE NEXT 50 YEARS OF SOHAPPY
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to take a detailed dive into the
balance of state regulatory authority and tribal treaty rights. Though
the Court heard two sequels to Puyallup I, neither of those opinions
went much beyond their predecessor’s adoption of the basic conservation
necessity framework.153 In Puyallup II, for example, though the Court
called on states to demonstrate some scientific basis for their regulatory
interests, the majority provided scant guidance on what would
constitute state discrimination against tribal treaty fishers and three
concurring justices saw need for further limits on treaty rights.154 And
that general approach was endorsed again when the Court considered
151 Cf. LCO VII, 740 F. Supp. at 1421 (“I appreciate the strength of the argument …
that any state regulation of such rights violates the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution. I appreciate also that the basis for state regulation has never been explained
satisfactorily. However, the legitimacy of state regulation in this area is not open to reconsideration.”) (citations omitted).
152 See, e.g., Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Commission (GLIFWC),
https://perma.cc/VB84-8CFV (last visited Apr. 18, 2020); Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish
Commission, https://perma.cc/C6PV-7V6K (last visited Apr. 18, 2020).
153 See, e.g., Dep’t of Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 414 U.S. 44, 48–49 (1973)
(holding that Washington’s prohibition of net fishing constituted discrimination against
tribal members but that the tribal treaty rights do not “persist down to the very last steelhead in the river.”); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game (Puyallup III), 433 U.S. 165, 175
(1977) (“Our construction of the Treaty of Medicine Creek in Puyallup I makes it perfectly
clear that although the State may not deny the Indians their right to fish ‘at all usual and
accustomed’ places, the treaty right is to be exercised ‘in common with all citizens of the
Territory.’ We squarely held that ‘the right to fish at those respective places is not an exclusive one.’ Rather, the exercise of that right was subject to reasonable regulation by the
State pursuant to its power to conserve an important natural resource.”) (citations omitted).
154 Puyallup II, 414 U.S. at 48–50 (White, J., concurring).
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the status of Chippewa treaty rights in Minnesota, an appeal that arose
from the Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians155 case
described above. There, the Court relied upon its prior adoption of the
“conservation necessity standard” to underscore the reconcilability of
state sovereignty and treaty rights and defeat Minnesota’s claims that
the Chippewa’s treaty rights were extinguished upon statehood.156 But,
while the Court has relied on the standard as a general proposition, two
recent treaty rights decisions indicate that the specifics of state
authority and the exercise of treaty reserved rights may still trouble the
justices.
In 2019’s Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den,
Inc.,157 for example, the Court again considered the Yakama’s 1855
treaty, this time with regard to its reservation of a right to travel for
tribal members. Washington sought to assess a tax upon the transport
of fuel by a tribal member owned company which, in its defense,
asserted that the state tax would directly burden those reserved
rights.158 While a plurality of the Court agreed with the tribal member
company and interpreted the treaty to prohibit the state tax, both
opinions reaching that conclusion expressly acknowledged the potential
for state regulatory authority over various aspects of the treaty-reserved
rights.159 And yet, short of ensuring that state regulations were
“nondiscriminatory” and did not interfere with the substance of the
treaty right itself, the plurality appeared to indicate acceptance of the
potential for state regulations in the interest of public safety but mostly
glossed over the specific limits on such state regulations; a treatment for
which the Chief Justice, in dissent, took both opinions to task.160 The
155 526 U.S. 172, 205 (1999) (“We have repeatedly reaffirmed state authority to impose
reasonable and necessary nondiscriminatory regulations on Indian hunting, fishing, and
gathering rights in the interest of conservation. This ‘conservation necessity’ standard accommodates both the State’s interest in management of its natural resources and the
Chippewa’s federally guaranteed treaty rights.”) (citations omitted).
156 Id.
157 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1004 (2019).
158 Id. at 1004.
159 See id. at 1015 (“Although we hold that the treaty protects the right to travel on the
public highway with goods, we do not say or imply that the treaty grants protection to carry any and all goods. Nor do we hold that the treaty deprives the State of the power to
regulate, say, when necessary for conservation. . . . Nor do we hold that the treaty deprives
the State of the power to regulate to prevent danger to health or safety occasioned by a
tribe member’s exercise of treaty rights. The record of the treaty negotiations may not
support the contention that the Yakamas expected to use the roads entirely unconstrained
by laws related to health or safety.”); id. at 1020–21 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (suggesting
that Washington may regulate the transportation of hazardous goods, like “bad apples . . .
just as the State may require tribal members to abide nondiscriminatory regulations governing the safe transportation of flammable cargo as they drive their gas trucks from Oregon to the reservation along public highways.”).
160 Id. at 1024–26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Application of state safety regulations,
for example, could prevent Indians from hunting and fishing in their traditional or preferred manner, or in particular ‘usual and accustomed places.’ I fear that, by creating the
need for this untested exception, the unwarranted expansion of the Yakamas’ right to
travel may undermine rights that the Yakamas and other tribes really did reserve.”).
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Chief Justice’s concerns suggest a willingness to carefully examine
potential state interference with the exercise of reserved rights, even in
the context of conservation necessity.161 If genuine, that willingness may
signal another ally for tribes seeking to insulate their treaty-reserved
rights from state regulations; however, the Chief Justice would also
consider arguments in favor of broader state authority.162
In the Court’s other significant treaty rights decision of 2019,
Herrera v. Wyoming,163 the Court upheld the treaty reserved rights of
the Crow Tribe but the majority “note[d] two ways in which [that]
decision is limited,” including that “[o]n remand, the State may press its
arguments as to why the application of state conservation regulations to
Crow Tribe members exercising the 1868 Treaty right is necessary for
conservation.”164 The Court did not consider those arguments in
reaching its decision.165 Despite leaving those arguments for another
day, the Court did address Wyoming’s concerns that recognizing the
Crow’s treaty rights would, in Wyoming’s view, undermine the state’s
previously “unquestioned” regulatory authority over wildlife.166
Wyoming argued that, since the Court’s 1896 decision in Ward v. Race
Horse,167 the state believed that treaty rights did not apply within its
boundaries and that modern recognition of Crow treaty rights would
disrupt “the settled expectations of private property owners.”168 Though
the Herrera majority dismissed those concerns as unfounded,169 the
passing reference to the Court’s increasing reliance on City of Sherrill v.
Oneida Indian Nation of New York170 and the possibility that a future
Court might be convinced by similar state concerns poses another
potential complexity for tribes addressing state arguments regarding
their regulatory authority over the exercise of treaty rights.
Ultimately, while both Cougar Den and Herrera reaffirmed the
commitment of a slim majority of Supreme Court justices to the

161 See id. at 1025 (“…the conservation exception would presumably protect regulations
that preserve the subject of the Yakamas’ right by maintaining safe and orderly travel on
the highways.”) (Emphasis added).
162 Id. (“Perhaps there are good reasons to revisit our long-held understanding of reserved treaty rights … and adopt a broad health and safety exception to deal with the inevitable fallout.”)
163 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019).
164 Id. at 1703.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 1698 n.3.
167 163 U.S. 504, 516 (1896).
168 Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1698 n.3.
169 Id. (“The State suggests that public support for its conservation efforts may be jeopardized if it no longer has ‘unquestioned’ authority over wildlife management in the Bighorn Mountains. Wyoming does not explain why its authority to regulate Indians exercising their treaty rights when necessary for conservation is not sufficient to preserve that
public support. The State’s passing reference to upsetting the settled expectations of private property owners is unconvincing because the 1868 Treaty right applies only to ‘unoccupied lands of the United States.’”) (citations omitted).
170 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
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foundational tenets of treaty rights precedent,171 and confirmed the
power and role of treaty rights in the modern era,172 the Court’s loose
treatment of the possibility of state regulatory authority suggests the
potential for future Supreme Court battles over the specifics of those
issues. Unlike the tenuous nature of tribal treaty rights after Puyallup
I, however, the last 50 years of progress since Sohappy have charted a
different and more stable path forward. The uncertain and conclusory
nature of a decision rendered in a particular case by justices far
removed from any on-the-ground implications stands in stark contrast
to the collaborative, practical, and ongoing approach engendered by
Judge Belloni.173 Following that approach, tribes and states in the
Pacific Northwest and Great Lakes have worked together for decades to
build better solutions and—perhaps more importantly—stronger
interagency and intergovernmental relationships.174 As a result, the
principles recognized by Judge Belloni in Sohappy—the permanence of
tribal treaties and state sovereignty and commitments to providing
clear, workable guidance and long-term solutions—have helped ensure
that the balance of tribal treaties and state authority remains mostly
functional across the country, subject to some ongoing skirmishes over
particularly difficult specifics.175
Beyond those continuing benefits of Judge Belloni’s framework,
tribes took advantage of the opportunities it presented to develop their
sovereign and technical capabilities, efforts that have sparked the
current era of tribal leadership in a variety of environmental and
natural resource arenas. The future will almost certainlty present
additional litigation over the scope of state authority and tribal treaty
rights. But, regardless of how those specific conflicts are resolved, the
Sohappy decision has provided a broader foundation from which tribes
171 The concluding paragraph of Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence will likely—and rightly—be prominently featured in every future treaty rights case. See Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct.
1000, 1021 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Really, this case just tells an old and familiar
story. The State of Washington includes millions of acres that the Yakamas ceded to the
United States under significant pressure. In return, the government supplied a handful of
modest promises. The State is now dissatisfied with the consequences of one of those
promises. It is a new day, and now it wants more. But today and to its credit, the Court
holds the parties to the terms of their deal. It is the least we can do.”).
172 Remarkably, the Supreme Court decision in Cougar Den affirmed the decision of the
Washington Supreme Court, which had also upheld the Yakama’s treaty rights and rejected the state’s attempts to tax Cougar Den. See Cougar Den v. State Dep’t of Licensing, 392
P.3d 1014 (Wash. 2017). Perhaps even more surprising than the United States Supreme
Court, the state supreme court decision demonstrates the tectonic shift in tribal rights
over the last century, particularly when compared to the views of the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Towessnute, 154 P. 805, 807 (Wash. 1916). See Blumm & Baermann, supra note 57, at 385 n. 266.
173 See supra notes 69–101 and accompanying text.
174 See, e.g., supra note 141; Blumm & Baermann, supra note 57, at 386 n. 272.
175 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 865 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming a
federal court injunction requiring the state to replace culverts that blocked or impeded
salmon migration and thereby interfered with the treaty reserved right of tribes to take
fish), aff’d by an equally divided Court per curiam, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018) (mem.).
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and their members can more effectively work with their state and
federal partners and continue to lead the way forward.

